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Wissenschaftliche Bewertung von DRM-Systemen
Scientific evaluation of DRM systems
a Adversary model
a Strength of existing systems
a Tendencies
a DRM technologies
a Summary
What is the scope of the attacker?
a More general: What are the security demands?
⌦ confidentiality of content
⌦ integrity of content
⌦ availability of content
a Confidentiality:
⌦ protection against piracy
copy one content
copy every content in a certain time frame
break the entire system (copy every message at every time)
a Integrity:
⌦ authorized access to content
⌦ protection of ownership of content
a Availability:
⌦ prevention of denial of service attacks
Adversary model
a Security depends on the supposed strength of the attacker.
a Resources
⌦ Money
⌦ Time
⌦ Knowledge
a insider or outsider
⌦ concerning organizational aspects
(secrecy of master encryption keys)
⌦ concerning design secrets
 (e.g. of protection functionality in hard- and software)
a Who wants to attack a system?
⌦ Hobbyist (naïve attacker, no financial efforts)
⌦ Serious attacker (intelligent, probably no financial efforts)
⌦ Professional attacker (intelligent, financial motivation)
The existence of specialized tools shifts
the “knowledge” to anybody
Strength of existing systems
a Very limited protection
⌦ Most systems
protect against hobbyists
⌦ DRM systems realized in software
no or nearly no protection against serious attacks
⌦ DRM systems realized in hardware
weak protection against serious attacks
a In the best case:
⌦ Technical components of DRM systems consist of special adapted
and well-known IT security functions
a Worst case:
⌦ Content contains proprietary DRM signals or functions without
any special protection
Tendencies
a Pirates try to “reverse engineer” DRM systems
⌦ make them useable on other platforms (Linux, …)
⌦ make them independent of a certain hardware and software
seller
a Pirates in the Internet shift their “activities” to services
⌦ peer-to-peer services
⌦ anonymous communication services
a Pirates may use Trojan Horses to get content illegally
⌦ This is a very subtle and serious thread!
a Attackers make their knowledge public as automated tools
⌦ Hobbyists can now do professional attacks
copy 
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a Basic IT security technologies
⌦ Encryption
⌦ Tamper resistant hardware devices
a Special designed DRM technologies
⌦ Fingerprinting
⌦ Watermarking
a Naïve security mechanisms
⌦ Regional coding of content
⌦ Filter mechanisms
⌦ Incompatible formats and media
⌦ DRM codes without any protections against removing
⌦ …
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Design Options for Copy Protection
a Protect pay-services from unauthorized access
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Make distributed signal difficult to use or copy
• timing signals in transmitted signal
• „copy resistant“ media
Design Options for Copy Protection
a Protect pay-services from unauthorized access
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Attention!
Scope is changing!
Not: Protection against illegal copying
But: Detection of copies
a Basic IT security technologies
⌦ Encryption
⌦ Tamper resistant hardware devices
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a Multicast
⌦ encrypted stream to all users
a individual decryption key
⌦ contains a fingerprint of the user
⌦ ID number / registration necessary
a Traitor tracing:
⌦ if illegal copy is detected the legal
customer can be traced back
a Only secure if both encrypted and
decrypted signal contains fingerprint
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decryption 
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> LoFi Broadcast, HiFi Encryption
broadcastfilter
cryptkey 1 Client 1
cryptkey 2 Client 2
cryptkey 3 Client 3
.
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.a Divide stream into quality layers
⌦ Everybody gets the low quality layer
⌦ Paying customers get encrypted layers
a MP3:
⌦ division of mp3 stream into quality layers
a costs are linear in the number of users
∆: delta
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Watermarking
a Watermarking:
⌦ Goal: Protection of authorship
⌦ Not: Protection against illegal copying
⌦ Possible: Detection of copies
Attacker
Watermark Signal:
Key
Original
Copyright (C) 1998
Document-ID: #A53-229D789
Author: J.Fitzgerald
Title: White Christmas
Distribution
Embedding
Watermarking
a Scope: Protect authorship of digital content
a correlation necessary
a few 100 bit
a strong changes
> Watermarking
a Digital-Analogue-Conversion
a Analogue-Digital-Conversion
a Re-Sampling
a Re-Quantization
a Compression
a Dithering
a Rotation
a Translation
a Cropping
a Scaling
a Collusion Attacks
Copyright (C) 1998
Document-ID: #A53-229D789
Author: J.Fitzgerald
Title: White Christmas
attacker
> Security of watermarking systems
a Theory
⌦ robustness
⌦ non-interference
⌦ detectability
a Praxis: (attacks by M. Kuhn, F. Petitcolas, 1997)
⌦ StirMark
  Software
  removes watermarks
  watermark is no longer detectable
  http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fapp2/watermarking/stirmark/
⌦ Mosaic Attack
divides web images into a mosaic of tabular cells
browser reconstructs the view of the image
Stirmark Attack
a non-linear transformation of a picture
a synchronization gets lost
a no anchor for detector to find the position of embedded signal
Mosaic Attack
a divides web images into a mosaic of tabular cells
a uses html statements
a browser reconstructs the view of the image
a protects from very simple web robots that look for illegally
distributed material
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DRM Technologies
Naïve security mechanisms – examples
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Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a copy protection in videos recorders
DVD player analogue video signal
contains “DRM” signal
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Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a copy protection in videos recorders
DVD player analogue video signal
contains “DRM” signal
sensitive pre-amp
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Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a DRM codes without any protections against removing
digital audio player digital audio
digital recorder
MD, CD-R (Audio), DAT
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Copy: content
with copy bit set
010011101111101111101011011101110011
Original: copy
bit unset
Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a DRM codes without any protections against removing
Original 010010101110101110101010011100110010
Copy 010011101111101111101011011101110011
digital audio player digital audio
digital recorder
MD, CD-R (Audio), DAT
Copy 010011101111
Reset copy bit to make copies
010010101110 !
Naïve security mechanisms – examples
a incompatible formats and media
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a incompatible formats and media
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Basic security goals and corresponding technologies
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Secure DRM systems
a Secure DRM systems connect a DRM signal with the content to
protect in a way that the content signal is useless without the DRM
signal.
a Options:
⌦ DRM signal is part of the content signal (e.g. in watermarking
systems)
⌦ DRM signal is necessary to access/decrypt the encrypted content
signal
a Important point:
⌦ Detection of DRM signal cannot be bypassed
⌦ Hardware or software encapsulation
a Software
⌦ not recommendable
a Hardware
⌦ breaking is a matter of time and money
